I first encountered the thought of Donald Davidson in 1982 in a graduate seminar conducted by Alasdair MacIntyre. The first thing I read was "Actions, Reasons, and Causes." The second thing I read was "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme." I have agreed with almost everything that I have come to understand from the work and thought of Donald Davidson. I agree with his views on truth and meaning, for example. I agree with his views on rational action and intention. I agree with his views on the distinction between causes of belief and reasons for belief. And I agree with his rejection of the intelligibility of the idea of a conceptual scheme. On that last one, I may well be in a minority among philosophers, and certainly am among academics. So I am wondering:
First, what motivates a belief in conceptual schemes? Why would one want to think that there are “alternative” conceptual schemes, or radically incommensurable conceptual schemes? What conceptual or theoretical (or political?) work does a belief in conceptual schemes achieve?
Second, on occasion I hear someone speaking of another person as living in a completely different world. If that is not hyperbolic, I cannot make sense of what I hear. Or could it be that the person meant that the other operated under a completely different conceptual scheme?
Third, and I think this might be different from the first two, I sometimes hear people, even reasonably intelligent academics, stating that some other people see the world completely differently from the way I see it. Again, apart from hyperbole I do not know how to make sense of that thought. I could make sense of the notion that a robot capable of ambulating without running into things sees the world differently than I do (actually, that it would be metaphorical to even say it sees).
Fourth (I am trying to understand why anyone should be attracted to the belief that there are alternative conceptual schemes), could it be that some confuse differences of language and vocabulary with differences of concept? For example, might my vocabulary for identifying birds be rather coarse, while an ornithologist would have a more fine-tuned and nuanced vocabulary? The ornithologist is more discriminating than I am.
4 comments:
Here is one possibility of alternative conceptual schemes (ACS). MacIntyre, in THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL INQUIRY presents the rival between Aristotelians and Augustinians at University of Paris in the 13th century as a case. But the incommensurability could "only be recognized and characterized by someone who inhabits both ACSs" and such persons "are rarely numerous" (114).
So, maybe there are ACSs, but not as widespread and as extensive as some lead us to expect.
I'm not familiar with Davidson's argument, but I do accept the idea of radically different conceptual schemes among people everywhere.
The idea that these many alternative CS are incommensurable does well to explain the (often futile) conflicts and misunderstandings present in the human experience. That's what motivates me to accept a belief in CS.
"Living in a different world" is a bit simplistic and as you say, hyperbolic. But people do see the world in radically different ways based on their conditioning and the concepts that have been made available to them. It's as simple as "what you see is what you look for." What people look for is relative to their values, experiences, and associated conditioning.
Suppose you were standing on a street corner next to a police officer. The observable data in front of you both is exactly the same, but the police officer sees threats, ordinance violations, and possible traffic stops (concepts). You are fully capable of seeing these things, but don't and probably don't care to.
My example isn't radical by any means. The cop learned a few things in the academy and you didn't - big deal right? It's the fact that none of us learn in the exact same way, or experience the same things, or value the exact same things, that makes the idea of conceptual schemes so powerful. There's an endless number of ways one could conceptualize the experience of standing on that street corner. They're not all incommensurable, but certainly, some are polarized to such an extent that any empathetic exercise in trying to "stand in the other's shoes" would be impossible.
In order to identify two views as in conflict and expressing misunderstandings, they'd have to be not radically different; they'd have to have much commonality in order to identify where they differ. So again I do not see radical difference, alternatives, or incommensurability.
In your example of the police officer and another citizen, you have shown that what the two see is not incommensurable. There are differences to be sure, but the police officer can see things as another citizen (most police officers are just another citizen 16 hours a day), and another citizen could be trained to see the things a police officer sees. Most of us have some concepts that other people do not have. And the reason we can say that and identify those differences is because we share a vast majority of our concepts. Again, no radically different, no alternative, no incommensurability.
In order to identify two views as in conflict and expressing misunderstandings, they'd have to be not radically different; they'd have to have much commonality in order to identify where they differ. So again I do not see radical difference, alternatives, or incommensurability.
In your example of the police officer and another citizen, you have shown that what the two see is not incommensurable. There are differences to be sure, but the police officer can see things as another citizen (most police officers are just another citizen 16 hours a day), and another citizen could be trained to see the things a police officer sees. Most of us have some concepts that other people do not have. And the reason we can say that and identify those differences is because we share a vast majority of our concepts. Again, no radically different, no alternative, no incommensurability.
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